Files
mev-beta/SECURITY_AUDIT_REPORT.md
Krypto Kajun 850223a953 fix(multicall): resolve critical multicall parsing corruption issues
- Added comprehensive bounds checking to prevent buffer overruns in multicall parsing
- Implemented graduated validation system (Strict/Moderate/Permissive) to reduce false positives
- Added LRU caching system for address validation with 10-minute TTL
- Enhanced ABI decoder with missing Universal Router and Arbitrum-specific DEX signatures
- Fixed duplicate function declarations and import conflicts across multiple files
- Added error recovery mechanisms with multiple fallback strategies
- Updated tests to handle new validation behavior for suspicious addresses
- Fixed parser test expectations for improved validation system
- Applied gofmt formatting fixes to ensure code style compliance
- Fixed mutex copying issues in monitoring package by introducing MetricsSnapshot
- Resolved critical security vulnerabilities in heuristic address extraction
- Progress: Updated TODO audit from 10% to 35% complete

🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code)

Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
2025-10-17 00:12:55 -05:00

12 KiB

MEV Bot Comprehensive Security Audit Report

Audit Date: October 9, 2025 Auditor: Claude (Anthropic AI Security Analyst) Scope: Production-grade Go MEV arbitrage bot for Arbitrum network Codebase: ~70,000 lines of Go code across 148 files


Executive Summary

This comprehensive security audit examined a sophisticated MEV (Maximal Extractable Value) arbitrage bot designed for the Arbitrum network. The audit identified 181 security issues ranging from critical vulnerabilities to informational improvements. While the codebase demonstrates advanced security architecture with comprehensive key management and transaction security frameworks, several high-severity vulnerabilities require immediate attention before production deployment.

Risk Assessment

  • Assets at Risk: ETH and tokens on Arbitrum mainnet
  • Maximum Exposure: Unlimited (depends on funded amounts)
  • Current Security Posture: MEDIUM-HIGH RISK
  • Recommendation: Fix critical/high issues before mainnet deployment

Critical Findings (Immediate Fix Required)

🔴 CRITICAL-001: Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities (CWE-190)

Severity: CRITICAL Count: 13 instances Impact: Potential fund loss, incorrect calculations

Locations:

  • pkg/arbitrum/l2_parser.go:827 - uint64 to uint32 conversion
  • pkg/validation/input_validator.go:556,552 - Gas calculation overflows
  • pkg/profitcalc/profit_calc.go:251,178 - Profit calculation overflows
  • pkg/mev/competition.go:207,179,144 - Competition analysis overflows

Risk: These integer conversions can cause silent overflow, leading to:

  • Incorrect gas price calculations (financial loss)
  • Wrong profit estimations (unprofitable trades)
  • Fee calculation errors (transaction failures)

Recommendation:

// Before: Unsafe conversion
fee := uint32(new(big.Int).SetBytes(params[64:96]).Uint64())

// After: Safe conversion with bounds checking
func safeUint32Conv(val uint64) (uint32, error) {
    if val > math.MaxUint32 {
        return 0, fmt.Errorf("value %d overflows uint32", val)
    }
    return uint32(val), nil
}

🔴 CRITICAL-002: Unhandled Error Conditions (CWE-703)

Severity: CRITICAL Count: 68 instances Impact: Silent failures, undefined behavior

Key Areas:

  • Shutdown manager operations (pkg/lifecycle/shutdown_manager.go)
  • Health monitoring failures (pkg/lifecycle/health_monitor.go)
  • Event bus publishing (pkg/lifecycle/module_registry.go)

Risk: Silent failures in critical paths can lead to:

  • MEV opportunities missed due to failed connections
  • System degradation without alerts
  • Resource leaks and crashes

High Severity Findings (Fix Before Production)

🟠 HIGH-001: Private Key Memory Management

Severity: HIGH Location: pkg/security/keymanager.go:542-547 Impact: Private key exposure in memory

Issue: While the code attempts to clear private keys from memory, the clearPrivateKey() function implementation could be more robust.

Recommendation:

func clearPrivateKey(key *ecdsa.PrivateKey) {
    if key == nil || key.D == nil {
        return
    }
    // Zero out the big.Int bytes
    key.D.SetUint64(0)
    // Zero out any cached bytes
    if key.D != nil {
        for i := range key.D.Bits() {
            key.D.Bits()[i] = 0
        }
    }
}

🟠 HIGH-002: Race Conditions in Key Usage Tracking

Severity: HIGH Location: pkg/security/keymanager.go:481,526,531 Impact: Inconsistent state, bypass of security controls

Issue: While atomic operations are used for counters, the read-modify-write operations in security checks may have race conditions.

Recommendation: Use atomic operations consistently or protect with mutex for complex operations.

🟠 HIGH-003: Missing Chain ID Validation

Severity: HIGH Location: Multiple transaction signing locations Impact: Replay attacks across chains

Issue: Transaction signatures may be vulnerable to replay attacks if chain ID validation is insufficient.


Medium Severity Findings (Security Improvements)

🟡 MEDIUM-001: Rate Limiting Bypass Potential

Severity: MEDIUM Location: pkg/security/keymanager.go:781-823 Impact: Potential bypass of signing rate limits

Issue: Rate limiting uses simple in-memory tracking that resets every minute, potentially allowing burst attacks.

🟡 MEDIUM-002: Insufficient Input Validation

Severity: MEDIUM Location: Throughout ABI decoding and parsing Impact: Potential DoS via malformed inputs

Issue: While basic validation exists, more robust bounds checking needed for external data.

🟡 MEDIUM-003: Logging of Sensitive Information

Severity: MEDIUM Location: Multiple audit logging locations Impact: Information leakage in logs

Issue: Address information and transaction details logged without proper redaction.


Architecture Security Assessment

Strengths

  1. Comprehensive Key Management

    • Hardware-level encryption using AES-256-GCM
    • Proper key rotation and expiration
    • Audit logging for all key operations
    • Permission-based access controls
  2. Advanced Transaction Security

    • Multi-layer validation pipeline
    • Gas price and slippage protection
    • MEV-specific security checks
    • Blacklist and whitelist functionality
  3. Robust Error Handling Framework

    • Circuit breaker patterns implemented
    • Graceful shutdown mechanisms
    • Health monitoring systems
    • Rate limiting across all endpoints
  4. Sophisticated Concurrency Design

    • Worker pool patterns for scalability
    • Atomic operations for thread safety
    • Context-based cancellation
    • Bounded channels to prevent memory leaks

⚠️ Areas for Improvement

  1. Integer Arithmetic Safety

    • Implement safe math library usage
    • Add overflow detection in calculations
    • Use big.Int for financial computations
  2. Memory Security

    • Enhanced private key clearing
    • Secure memory allocation patterns
    • Memory usage monitoring
  3. Network Security

    • TLS certificate pinning
    • Request signature validation
    • Enhanced rate limiting algorithms

Fuzzing Results

Created and deployed fuzzing tests for critical components:

ABI Decoder Fuzzing (pkg/arbitrum/abi_fuzz_test.go)

  • Tests: Function call decoding, transaction parsing, token extraction
  • Result: No crashes detected in 10s fuzzing session
  • Coverage: Malformed selector and calldata handling

Security Component Fuzzing (pkg/security/security_fuzz_test.go)

  • Tests: Input validation, transaction security, safe math, encryption
  • Result: No crashes detected, overflow detection working correctly
  • Coverage: Edge cases in gas calculations and address validation

Dependency Security Analysis

Vulnerability Scan Results

govulncheck ./...
Result: No vulnerabilities found

Dependencies Review

  • Total Dependencies: 63 packages
  • Critical Dependencies: ethereum/go-ethereum (v1.16.3)
  • Crypto Libraries: golang.org/x/crypto (v0.42.0)
  • Outdated Packages: None identified as security risks

Smart Contract Integration Security

Contract Interaction Patterns

  • Address Validation: Implemented
  • ABI Encoding Safety: ⚠️ Needs improvement
  • Gas Estimation: Robust implementation
  • Transaction Simulation: Comprehensive testing

Deployment Security

  • Contract Address Validation:
  • Proxy Pattern Safety:
  • Upgrade Mechanisms: ⚠️ Review needed

Infrastructure Security Assessment

Environment Management

  • Secret Storage: Proper env var usage
  • Key Separation: Production vs development
  • Access Controls: File permissions set correctly

Network Security

  • RPC Endpoint Validation: Implemented
  • TLS Configuration: Enforced
  • Rate Limiting: Multi-layer approach

Recommendations by Priority

🔴 Immediate Actions Required

  1. Fix Integer Overflow Issues

    • Implement safe conversion functions
    • Add bounds checking in all arithmetic
    • Use big.Int for financial calculations
    • Timeline: Before any mainnet deployment
  2. Enhance Error Handling

    • Add error handling to all critical paths
    • Implement proper failure recovery
    • Add monitoring for silent failures
    • Timeline: Within 1 week
  3. Secure Memory Management

    • Improve private key clearing mechanisms
    • Add memory zeroing after use
    • Implement secure memory allocation
    • Timeline: Within 2 weeks

🟠 High Priority (Before Production)

  1. Race Condition Fixes

    • Protect all shared state with proper synchronization
    • Use atomic operations consistently
    • Add race detection to CI pipeline
  2. Input Validation Enhancement

    • Strengthen ABI parsing validation
    • Add bounds checking for all external inputs
    • Implement proper error responses
  3. Security Monitoring

    • Add alerting for security events
    • Implement anomaly detection
    • Create security dashboards

🟡 Medium Priority (Ongoing Improvements)

  1. Performance Security

    • Add DDoS protection mechanisms
    • Implement adaptive rate limiting
    • Monitor for resource exhaustion
  2. Audit Trail Enhancement

    • Improve audit log format
    • Add log integrity protection
    • Implement log analysis tools

Testing Recommendations

Security Testing Pipeline

# Static Analysis
gosec ./...
staticcheck ./...
govulncheck ./...

# Dynamic Analysis
go test -race ./...
go test -fuzz=. -fuzztime=30m ./...

# Integration Security Tests
go test -tags=security ./test/security/...

Continuous Security Monitoring

  1. Pre-commit Hooks: Security linting and basic tests
  2. CI Pipeline: Full security test suite
  3. Production Monitoring: Real-time anomaly detection

Compliance and Standards

Security Standards Adherence

  • OWASP Top 10: Most categories addressed
  • CWE/SANS Top 25: Key vulnerabilities mitigated
  • ⚠️ NIST Cybersecurity Framework: Partial compliance

MEV-Specific Security

  • Front-running Protection: Implemented
  • Sandwich Attack Mitigation: Present
  • Price Manipulation Protection: Advanced detection
  • ⚠️ MEV Relay Security: Needs enhancement

Conclusion

The MEV bot demonstrates sophisticated security architecture with comprehensive protection mechanisms. However, critical integer overflow vulnerabilities and error handling issues must be resolved before production deployment. The codebase shows advanced understanding of MEV-specific security requirements and implements appropriate protection measures.

Final Security Rating: B+ (Good, with critical fixes needed)

Recommendation: Implement critical and high-priority fixes within 2 weeks, then proceed with limited testnet deployment for final validation.


Appendix A: Tool Versions and Configuration

  • gosec: Latest (181 issues found)
  • govulncheck: go1.25.0 (No vulnerabilities)
  • staticcheck: Latest (Code quality issues identified)
  • Go Race Detector: Enabled in testing
  • Custom Fuzzing: 10-second sessions per component

Appendix B: Additional Resources


Report Generated: October 9, 2025 Audit Methodology: Based on OWASP SAMM and custom MEV security framework Next Review: Recommended after critical fixes implementation