# Copper Tone Technologies - Comprehensive Security & Code Audit Report **Date:** November 21, 2025 **Auditor:** Claude Code **Version:** 1.0 --- ## Executive Summary This audit covers the Copper Tone Technologies platform, a Vue 3 PWA frontend with Go microservices backend. The platform includes authentication, work management, payment processing, and blog services. ### Overall Risk Assessment: **MEDIUM** | Category | Status | Risk Level | |----------|--------|------------| | Dependencies | PASS | LOW | | Authentication | PASS | LOW | | Authorization | PASS | LOW | | SQL Injection | PASS | LOW | | XSS Prevention | PASS | LOW | | CORS Configuration | WARN | MEDIUM | | Container Security | PASS | LOW | | Secret Management | WARN | MEDIUM | | PWA Functionality | FAIL | LOW | | Input Validation | WARN | MEDIUM | | Rate Limiting | FAIL | MEDIUM | | Security Headers | WARN | MEDIUM | --- ## Section 1: Dependency Vulnerabilities ### 1.1 Frontend (npm) **Status:** PASS ``` npm audit --omit=dev found 0 vulnerabilities ``` **Dependencies:** - Vue 3.5.22 - Current - Vue Router 4.6.3 - Current - Pinia 3.0.3 - Current - DOMPurify 3.2.3 - Current (XSS protection) - Vite 7.1.11 - Current ### 1.2 Backend (Go) **Status:** PASS ``` go mod verify all modules verified ``` **Dependencies:** - go-ethereum v1.14.12 - Blockchain integration - golang-jwt/jwt v5.3.0 - JWT handling - lib/pq v1.10.9 - PostgreSQL driver - golang.org/x/crypto v0.30.0 - Cryptography --- ## Section 2: Authentication & Authorization ### 2.1 JWT Implementation **Status:** PASS **Positive Findings:** - JWT secret minimum length enforced (32 characters) - Warning logged for secrets < 64 characters - Using HS256 signing algorithm - Token expiration set (24 hours) **Code Reference:** `backend/functions/auth-service/main.go:136-146` ```go if len(jwtSecret) < 32 { log.Fatal("JWT_SECRET must be at least 32 characters for security") } ``` **Recommendation:** Consider using RS256 (asymmetric) for production environments. ### 2.2 Password Security **Status:** PASS **Positive Findings:** - Using bcrypt for password hashing - Using bcrypt.DefaultCost (10 rounds) **Code Reference:** `backend/functions/auth-service/main.go:261` ```go passwordHash, err := bcrypt.GenerateFromPassword([]byte(req.Password), bcrypt.DefaultCost) ``` **Recommendation:** Consider bcrypt cost of 12+ for higher security. ### 2.3 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) **Status:** PASS **Implemented Roles:** - `ADMIN` - Full system access - `STAFF` - Internal operations - `CLIENT` - Customer access **Protected Routes:** ```go // Admin only routes http.HandleFunc("/admin/users", authenticate(requireRole(handleGetAllUsers, "ADMIN"))) http.HandleFunc("/admin/users/promote-role", authenticate(requireRole(handlePromoteUserRole, "ADMIN"))) http.HandleFunc("/admin/users/demote-role", authenticate(requireRole(handleDemoteUserRole, "ADMIN"))) ``` **Security Features:** - First user auto-promoted to ADMIN - Public registration restricted to CLIENT role - Self-demotion prevention for ADMIN role - Minimum one role requirement ### 2.4 Blockchain Authentication **Status:** PASS **Implementation:** - Ethereum signature verification - Message signing for authentication - Address normalization **Code Reference:** `backend/functions/auth-service/main.go:779-809` --- ## Section 3: SQL Injection Prevention ### 3.1 Parameterized Queries **Status:** PASS **Finding:** All database queries use parameterized statements with `$1`, `$2`, etc. **Example (Safe):** ```go err = tx.QueryRow( "INSERT INTO users (name, email, created_at) VALUES ($1, $2, NOW()) RETURNING id", req.Name, req.Email, ).Scan(&userID) ``` **No instances of string concatenation in SQL queries found.** --- ## Section 4: Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) Prevention ### 4.1 Frontend XSS Protection **Status:** PASS **Measures:** - DOMPurify v3.2.3 installed for HTML sanitization - Vue's default template escaping active - Limited use of `v-html` directive **v-html Usage Found:** - `ArticleDetailView.vue` - Blog content (sanitized) - `ServiceDetailView.vue` - Service descriptions (sanitized) **Recommendation:** Ensure all `v-html` content passes through DOMPurify. --- ## Section 5: CORS Configuration ### 5.1 Current Configuration **Status:** WARNING **Issue:** CORS allows all origins by default ```yaml CORS_ALLOW_ORIGIN: ${CORS_ALLOW_ORIGIN:-*} ``` **Risk:** Cross-origin requests from any domain accepted. **Recommendation:** ```yaml # Production CORS_ALLOW_ORIGIN: https://coppertone.tech ``` --- ## Section 6: Container Security ### 6.1 Running Containers **Status:** PASS | Service | Port | Status | |---------|------|--------| | frontend | 8090 | Running | | auth-service | 8082 | Running | | work-management-service | 8083 | Running | | payment-service | 8084 | Running | | blog-service | 8085 | Running | | db (PostgreSQL) | Internal | Running | ### 6.2 Container User Privileges **Status:** PASS **Auth Service Container:** ```dockerfile RUN addgroup -g 1000 appuser && adduser -D -u 1000 -G appuser appuser USER appuser ``` **Finding:** Backend services run as non-root user. ### 6.3 Database Exposure **Status:** PASS **Finding:** PostgreSQL port (5432) not exposed externally. ```yaml # ports: # - "5432:5432" # Commented out ``` --- ## Section 7: Secret Management ### 7.1 Environment Variables **Status:** WARNING **Current Configuration (podman-compose.yml):** ```yaml JWT_SECRET: ${JWT_SECRET:-dev_jwt_secret_key_change_me_in_production_at_least_64_characters_long} DB_PASSWORD: ${DB_PASSWORD:-password} STRIPE_SECRET_KEY: ${STRIPE_SECRET_KEY:-sk_test_placeholder} ``` **Issues:** 1. Default JWT secret in compose file 2. Default database password ("password") 3. Placeholder Stripe keys **Recommendation:** - Use `.env` file (not committed to git) - Use secrets management (HashiCorp Vault, Docker secrets) - Never use defaults in production ### 7.2 Git Secret Exposure **Status:** PASS **Finding:** No secrets found committed to repository. - No `.env` files in git - No private keys in repository --- ## Section 8: HTTP Security Headers ### 8.1 Missing Headers **Status:** WARNING **Missing Headers:** - `Strict-Transport-Security` (HSTS) - `Content-Security-Policy` (CSP) - `X-Frame-Options` - `X-Content-Type-Options` - `X-XSS-Protection` (deprecated but harmless) **Recommendation:** Add to nginx.conf: ```nginx add_header X-Frame-Options "SAMEORIGIN" always; add_header X-Content-Type-Options "nosniff" always; add_header Strict-Transport-Security "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains" always; add_header Content-Security-Policy "default-src 'self'; script-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline';" always; ``` --- ## Section 9: Rate Limiting ### 9.1 Authentication Endpoints **Status:** FAIL **Finding:** No rate limiting on authentication endpoints. **Risk:** Brute force attacks on login endpoints. **Affected Endpoints:** - `/login-email-password` - `/login-blockchain` - `/register-email-password` - `/register-blockchain` **Recommendation:** Implement rate limiting: ```go // Using golang.org/x/time/rate limiter := rate.NewLimiter(rate.Every(time.Second), 5) // 5 requests/second ``` --- ## Section 10: Input Validation ### 10.1 Backend Validation **Status:** WARNING **Current Validation:** - Empty field checks for registration - Role validation (CLIENT, STAFF, ADMIN) **Missing Validation:** - Email format validation - Password complexity requirements - Input length limits **Recommendation:** ```go // Email validation emailRegex := regexp.MustCompile(`^[a-zA-Z0-9._%+-]+@[a-zA-Z0-9.-]+\.[a-zA-Z]{2,}$`) if !emailRegex.MatchString(req.Email) { http.Error(w, "Invalid email format", http.StatusBadRequest) return } // Password requirements if len(req.Password) < 8 { http.Error(w, "Password must be at least 8 characters", http.StatusBadRequest) return } ``` --- ## Section 11: Database Security ### 11.1 SSL/TLS Connection **Status:** WARNING (Development) **Current Setting:** ```yaml DB_SSL_MODE: ${DB_SSL_MODE:-disable} ``` **Finding:** SSL disabled for development. Code properly enforces SSL by default. **Code Reference:** `backend/functions/auth-service/main.go:164-184` ```go if sslMode == "" { sslMode = "require" log.Println("WARNING: DB_SSL_MODE not set, defaulting to 'require' for security") } ``` --- ## Section 12: PWA Functionality ### 12.1 Install Prompt **Status:** FAIL **Issue:** PWA install button not appearing in browser. **Root Cause:** Icon files are placeholder files (203-206 bytes), not valid images. ``` -rw-r--r-- 203 android-chrome-192x192.png # Too small - placeholder -rw-r--r-- 206 android-chrome-512x512.png # Too small - placeholder ``` **Requirements for PWA Install:** 1. Valid manifest.json (PASS) 2. Service worker registered (PASS) 3. Valid icons 192x192 and 512x512 (FAIL) 4. HTTPS or localhost (PASS) **Fix Required:** Generate proper PNG icons at 192x192 and 512x512 pixels. --- ## Section 13: Frontend Code Quality ### 13.1 Null Safety Issues **Status:** FIXED (This Session) **Fixed Files:** - `ProjectsView.vue` - Added computed with null coalescing - `InvoicesView.vue` - Added array fallbacks - `stores/projects.ts` - Array validation on API response - `stores/tasks.ts` - Array validation on API response - `stores/invoices.ts` - Array validation on API response ### 13.2 Service Worker Caching **Status:** FIXED (This Session) **Issue:** Old cached JavaScript files causing errors. **Fix Applied:** - Updated cache version to v2 - Implemented network-first strategy for assets - Added skipWaiting() and clients.claim() --- ## Section 14: Backend Code Quality ### 14.1 Go Vet **Status:** PASS ``` go vet ./... # No issues found ``` ### 14.2 Server Timeouts **Status:** PASS **Implemented Timeouts:** ```go server := &http.Server{ ReadHeaderTimeout: 10 * time.Second, ReadTimeout: 15 * time.Second, WriteTimeout: 15 * time.Second, IdleTimeout: 60 * time.Second, } ``` ### 14.3 Audit Logging **Status:** PASS **Finding:** Role changes logged with audit trail. ```go log.Printf("AUDIT: Admin user %d granted %s role to user %d (%s)", adminUserID, req.Role, req.UserID, userName) ``` --- ## Section 15: Functionality Status ### 15.1 Implemented Features | Feature | Status | Notes | |---------|--------|-------| | Email/Password Auth | COMPLETE | | | Blockchain Auth | COMPLETE | Ethereum signatures | | Multi-Identity | COMPLETE | Link multiple auth methods | | Role Management | COMPLETE | Promote/demote users | | Admin Dashboard | COMPLETE | User management | | Staff Dashboard | COMPLETE | Kanban task board | | Client Dashboard | PARTIAL | Basic stats only | | Projects CRUD | COMPLETE | API ready | | Tasks CRUD | COMPLETE | API ready | | Invoices CRUD | COMPLETE | API ready | | Payments (Stripe) | PARTIAL | Integration started | | Digital Business Card | COMPLETE | QR, vCard, share | | Blog | COMPLETE | Markdown rendering | | PWA | BROKEN | Missing icons | ### 15.2 Missing/Incomplete Features 1. **Client Dashboard** - Needs project detail views 2. **Payment Processing** - Stripe webhooks incomplete 3. **IPFS Integration** - Planned but not implemented 4. **Matrix Messaging** - Planned but not implemented 5. **Email Notifications** - Not implemented --- ## Recommendations Summary ### Critical (Fix Immediately) 1. Generate valid PWA icons (192x192 and 512x512 PNG) 2. Set strong JWT_SECRET in production 3. Change default database password ### High Priority 4. Implement rate limiting on auth endpoints 5. Add security headers to nginx 6. Restrict CORS to specific origins in production 7. Enable database SSL in production ### Medium Priority 8. Add email format validation 9. Implement password complexity requirements 10. Increase bcrypt cost to 12 11. Complete Client Dashboard 12. Add comprehensive input validation ### Low Priority 13. Consider RS256 JWT signing 14. Add E2E tests for critical flows 15. Implement refresh tokens 16. Add request logging/monitoring --- ## Appendix A: Audit Script An automated audit script has been created at: ``` scripts/audit.sh ``` Run with: ```bash ./scripts/audit.sh ``` --- ## Appendix B: Files Modified This Session 1. `frontend/src/stores/projects.ts` - Null safety 2. `frontend/src/stores/tasks.ts` - Null safety 3. `frontend/src/stores/invoices.ts` - Null safety 4. `frontend/src/views/ProjectsView.vue` - Computed property fix 5. `frontend/src/views/InvoicesView.vue` - Array fallbacks 6. `frontend/public/service-worker.js` - Cache strategy update 7. `backend/functions/auth-service/main.go` - Admin endpoints --- **End of Audit Report**