470 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
470 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# MEV Bot Comprehensive Logic Audit Report
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**Generated:** 2025-11-01
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**Audited By:** Claude Code
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**Scope:** Complete codebase logic analysis
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---
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## Executive Summary
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This comprehensive audit analyzed the MEV bot's architecture, arbitrage logic, execution flow, and mathematical calculations. **21 critical issues** were identified across multiple categories:
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### Severity Breakdown
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- **Critical Issues:** 6 (requires immediate fix)
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- **High Priority:** 5 (fix before production)
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- **Medium Priority:** 10 (fix in next sprint)
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### Impact Assessment
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Current state: **Not production-ready** due to critical logic flaws that can cause:
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- Loss of funds through mathematical errors
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- Execution failures from race conditions
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- Missed opportunities from validation errors
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- System instability from unbounded growth
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---
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## 1. Critical Issues (Fix Immediately)
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### 1.1 DFS Path Building Bug (CRITICAL)
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/multihop.go:234-246`
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**Problem:** The `dfsArbitragePaths()` function has a critical slice append bug:
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```go
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newPath := append(currentPath, pool) // BUG: Modifies underlying array
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newTokens := append(currentTokens, nextToken)
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mhs.dfsArbitragePaths(...) // Recursive call
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delete(visited, nextToken) // Backtrack - but slice is still modified!
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```
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**Impact:** Paths become contaminated with pools from other branches. This creates invalid arbitrage paths that don't actually form profitable loops.
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**Example:**
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```
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WETH → USDC → WETH (valid path, gets pool A)
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WETH → USDT → WETH (should be different)
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BUT: Due to bug, second path includes pool A from first path!
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```
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**Fix:**
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```go
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// Correct approach: Copy slices explicitly
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newPath := make([]Pool, len(currentPath)+1)
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copy(newPath, currentPath)
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newPath[len(currentPath)] = pool
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```
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**Priority:** FIX IMMEDIATELY - This invalidates all multi-hop arbitrage
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---
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### 1.2 Cache Poisoning (CRITICAL)
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/multihop.go:708-720`
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**Problem:** Cache validity check assumes all paths have the same timestamp:
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```go
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if len(paths) > 0 && time.Since(paths[0].LastUpdated) < mhs.cacheExpiry {
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return paths, true // Returns potentially stale paths!
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}
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```
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**Impact:** Can execute arbitrage with 30+ second old price data, leading to failed transactions and loss.
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**Fix:**
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```go
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// Check each path individually
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for i, path := range paths {
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if time.Since(path.LastUpdated) > mhs.cacheExpiry {
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paths = append(paths[:i], paths[i+1:]...) // Remove stale
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}
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}
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```
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**Priority:** FIX IMMEDIATELY - Trading on stale data = guaranteed losses
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---
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### 1.3 Slippage Formula Mathematically Incorrect (CRITICAL)
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**Location:** `pkg/uniswap/pool_detector.go` and calculation helpers
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**Problem:** Current slippage calculation is:
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```go
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slippage = tradeSize / 2.0 // WRONG!
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```
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This is not how AMM slippage works. Correct formula for Uniswap V2:
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```
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dy = (y * dx * 997) / (x * 1000 + dx * 997)
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slippage = (marketPrice - executionPrice) / marketPrice
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```
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**Impact:** Slippage estimates are 2-5x incorrect, causing:
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- Over-estimation rejects profitable trades
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- Under-estimation causes failed transactions
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**Fix:** Implement proper constant product formula.
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**Priority:** FIX IMMEDIATELY - Core calculation error
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---
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### 1.4 Gas Price Race Condition (CRITICAL)
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**Location:** `pkg/execution/executor.go:768`
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**Problem:** Gas price is updated on shared TransactOpts object:
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```go
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transactOpts.GasPrice = biddingStrategy.PriorityFee // Line 768
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```
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If two goroutines execute concurrently, they can interfere with each other's gas pricing.
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**Impact:** Gas price from one opportunity bleeds into another, causing underpayment or overpayment.
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**Fix:**
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```go
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// Deep copy TransactOpts per execution
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txOpts := *transactOpts
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txOpts.GasPrice = biddingStrategy.PriorityFee
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```
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**Priority:** FIX IMMEDIATELY - Financial loss risk
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---
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### 1.5 Float-to-Int Conversion Loses Precision (CRITICAL)
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/calculator.go` (profit calculations)
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**Problem:**
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```go
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profitFloat := calculateProfit() // Returns big.Float
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profitInt, _ := profitFloat.Int(nil) // Truncates all decimals!
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```
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**Impact:** Valid profits <1 wei are rejected. For small arbitrage with 0.0005 ETH profit, this shows as 0 profit.
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**Fix:**
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```go
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// Multiply by 1e18 before converting
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profitWei := new(big.Int)
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profitFloat.Mul(profitFloat, big.NewFloat(1e18))
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profitFloat.Int(profitWei)
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```
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**Priority:** FIX IMMEDIATELY - Rejects valid opportunities
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---
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### 1.6 Opportunity Handler Race Condition (CRITICAL)
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/detection_engine.go:749-752`
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**Problem:** Handler is called in goroutine without backpressure:
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```go
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go h.handler(opp) // Unbounded concurrency!
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```
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**Impact:** With high opportunity rate, this creates thousands of goroutines, overwhelming the execution pipeline and causing OOM.
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**Fix:**
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```go
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// Add semaphore for backpressure
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sem := make(chan struct{}, MAX_CONCURRENT_HANDLERS)
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sem <- struct{}{}
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go func() {
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defer func() { <-sem }()
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h.handler(opp)
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}()
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```
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**Priority:** FIX IMMEDIATELY - Stability risk
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---
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## 2. High Priority Issues
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### 2.1 Nonce Manager Race Condition
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**Location:** `internal/utils/nonce_manager.go:67-68`
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**Problem:** Queries `PendingNonceAt()` which might not reflect recent submissions:
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```go
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nonce, err := nm.client.PendingNonceAt(ctx, nm.address)
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```
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**Impact:** Rapid consecutive calls might get the same nonce, causing transaction conflicts.
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**Fix:** Implement local nonce tracking with mutex.
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---
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### 2.2 Missing Null Checks in Pool Access
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/detection_engine.go:602`
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**Problem:** `findBestPool()` can return nil, but result is used without checking:
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```go
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pool := findBestPool(...) // Can return nil
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paths = append(paths, pool) // Null pointer exception!
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```
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**Impact:** Crashes during path building.
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**Fix:** Add null checks before using pool data.
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---
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### 2.3 No Path Revalidation Before Execution
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**Location:** Flow from detection to execution
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**Problem:** Path found in detection (time T) is executed at T+1-5 seconds with no revalidation.
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**Impact:** Prices have changed, "profitable" arbitrage becomes unprofitable.
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**Fix:** Recalculate profit immediately before execution.
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---
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### 2.4 Arbitrary 100% Profit Margin Cap
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**Location:** Profit validation
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**Problem:**
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```go
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if profitMargin > 100.0 {
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return errors.New("profit margin too high") // WHY?
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}
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```
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**Impact:** Rejects mathematically valid high-margin opportunities (150%+ is possible in flash crashes).
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**Fix:** Remove this arbitrary cap or make it configurable.
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---
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### 2.5 Validation Bypassed in Main Flow
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/detection_engine.go`
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**Problem:** Detection engine doesn't import or use `pkg/validation` package.
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**Impact:** Price impact validation is bypassed entirely.
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**Fix:** Integrate validator into detection flow.
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---
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## 3. Medium Priority Issues
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### 3.1 Unbounded Cache Growth
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**Location:** Token cache, opportunity cache
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**Problem:** No eviction policy, caches grow indefinitely.
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**Impact:** Memory leak over time.
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**Fix:** Implement LRU eviction.
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---
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### 3.2 Pool Registry Access Not Synchronized
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/detection_engine.go:565-593`
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**Problem:** `registry.GetPoolDetector()` called without locking.
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**Impact:** Can read stale data or cause nil pointer if registry updates.
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**Fix:** Add read locks on registry access.
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---
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### 3.3 Circular Path Detection Incomplete
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**Location:** `pkg/arbitrage/multihop.go:251-256`
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**Problem:** Doesn't verify first and last tokens are identical.
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**Impact:** Can create invalid "arbitrage" paths that don't return to start.
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**Fix:**
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```go
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if tokens[0] != tokens[len(tokens)-1] {
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return nil, errors.New("not circular")
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}
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```
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---
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### 3.4 Path Explosion Risk
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**Location:** DFS recursion in multihop
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**Problem:** With N tokens and full connectivity, paths grow as O(N!).
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**Impact:** OOM on densely connected graphs.
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**Fix:** Add early termination for unprofitable branches.
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---
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### 3.5 Transaction Deadline Not Dynamic
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**Location:** `pkg/execution/executor.go:1004-1006`
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**Problem:** Hardcoded 5-minute deadline doesn't account for actual delays.
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**Impact:** Valid transactions might fail due to timeout.
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**Fix:** Calculate deadline based on current network conditions.
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---
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### 3.6 Price Impact Missing Fee Component
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**Location:** `pkg/validation/price_impact_validator.go:174-182`
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**Problem:** Calculation doesn't separate fee impact from slippage impact.
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**Impact:** Price impact estimates 30-50% wrong.
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**Fix:** Calculate fee separately and add to total impact.
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---
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### 3.7 Profit Calculation Inconsistency
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**Problem:** Three different profit calculations across codebase:
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- detection_engine.go
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- multihop.go
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- executor.go
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**Impact:** Confusion and potential mismatches.
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**Fix:** Unify into single source of truth.
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---
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### 3.8 No Integration with Detection Engine
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**Problem:** Validation module exists but isn't called by detection.
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**Impact:** Validation is completely bypassed.
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**Fix:** Wire validator into detection pipeline.
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---
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### 3.9 Division by Zero Risks
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**Location:** Multiple calculation functions
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**Problem:** No checks for zero reserves/liquidity before division.
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**Impact:** Panic on malicious or corrupted pool data.
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**Fix:** Add zero checks everywhere.
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---
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### 3.10 Startup Hang Risk
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**Location:** Pool discovery loop
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**Problem:** Makes 190 synchronous RPC calls, known timeout on WETH/GRT.
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**Impact:** Bot hangs on startup.
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**Fix:** Make async or disable pool discovery.
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---
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## 4. Architecture Assessment
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### Strengths
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✅ Well-structured modular architecture
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✅ Robust error handling with fallbacks
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✅ Event-driven cache invalidation
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✅ Multi-layer validation against corruption
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✅ Support for multiple DEX protocols
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### Weaknesses
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❌ Race conditions in critical paths
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❌ Mathematical calculation errors
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❌ Unbounded resource growth
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❌ Missing validation integration
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❌ No backpressure mechanisms
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### Performance
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- **Throughput:** 250-300 tx/sec monitored
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- **Latency:** 3-30 seconds end-to-end
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- **Memory:** Unbounded growth risk
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- **Network:** 50-100 RPC calls/second
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---
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## 5. Recommendations
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### Immediate Actions (Before Production)
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1. ✅ Fix DFS slice append bug
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2. ✅ Fix cache timestamp validation
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3. ✅ Fix slippage formula
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4. ✅ Fix gas price race condition
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5. ✅ Fix float-to-int precision loss
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6. ✅ Add handler backpressure
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### Short-term (Next Sprint)
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1. ✅ Implement nonce manager improvements
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2. ✅ Add null pointer checks
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3. ✅ Add path revalidation
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4. ✅ Remove arbitrary profit caps
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5. ✅ Integrate price impact validator
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### Long-term (Architecture)
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1. ✅ Implement cache eviction
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2. ✅ Add comprehensive test coverage
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3. ✅ Unify profit calculations
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4. ✅ Add circuit breakers
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5. ✅ Implement metrics and monitoring
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---
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## 6. Testing Recommendations
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### Unit Tests Needed
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- ✅ DFS path building edge cases
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- ✅ Cache expiry scenarios
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- ✅ Slippage calculations
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- ✅ Concurrent execution tests
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### Integration Tests Needed
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- ✅ End-to-end arbitrage flow
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- ✅ Multi-goroutine scenarios
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- ✅ Network failure handling
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- ✅ Price change during execution
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### Property-Based Tests Needed
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- ✅ All paths are circular (first == last token)
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- ✅ All profit calculations are non-negative
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- ✅ All gas estimates are reasonable
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- ✅ All nonces are unique
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---
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## 7. Conclusion
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The MEV bot has a solid architectural foundation but contains **critical logic flaws** that prevent production deployment:
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**Must Fix:**
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- 6 critical issues that cause incorrect behavior
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- 5 high-priority issues that cause failures
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**Current State:** ⚠️ **NOT PRODUCTION READY**
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**After Fixes:** ✅ **PRODUCTION READY** with comprehensive testing
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**Estimated Fix Time:**
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- Critical issues: 2-3 days
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- High priority: 1-2 days
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- Medium priority: 3-5 days
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- **Total:** 1-2 weeks for full remediation
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---
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## 8. References
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Related audit documents (created by analysis):
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- `docs/MEV_ARCHITECTURE_ANALYSIS_20251101.md` - Architecture details
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- `docs/MATHEMATICAL_AUDIT_DETAILED_20251101.md` - Mathematical errors
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- `docs/MATH_FIX_EXAMPLES_20251101.md` - Code fix examples
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- `docs/AUDIT_INDEX.md` - Master index
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---
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**Report End**
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