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mev-beta/docs/PRODUCTION_READINESS_PLAN_20251103.md

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# Production Readiness Plan - November 3, 2025
## Executive Summary
The MEV Bot is architecturally sound but has **critical blockers** preventing production deployment:
1. **Pool Validation Error**: 75% of blacklisted pools are invalid addresses (no contract deployed)
2. **Multi-Hop Scanner**: Returns 0 paths due to placeholder pool data
3. **Security Manager**: Disabled during debugging
4. **No Arbitrage Execution**: Currently detecting 0 profitable opportunities
---
## Critical Issue #1: Invalid Pool Addresses (75% of blacklist)
### Root Cause
When pools fail to return `token0()` or `token1()`, they're being blacklisted. However:
- **75% have NO contract deployed** (no bytecode at address)
- **25% are valid UniswapV3 pools** being incorrectly rejected
### Current Error Pattern
```
Error getting pool data for 0xC6962004f452bE9203591991D15f6b388e09E8D0: pool is blacklisted:
failed to call token1() - non-standard pool contract
```
### Why This Happens
1. **Event Log Misinterpretation**: Addresses extracted from wrong positions in swap logs
2. **Invalid Pool Candidates**: Some addresses in logs aren't actual pools (wrapped tokens, routers, etc.)
3. **Zero Address Handling**: Not validating that pool address ≠ 0x0
### Solution
Implement proper pool validation in `pkg/scanner/swap/analyzer.go:161` (line where `GetPoolData` is called):
```go
// Before calling GetPoolData, validate the address
if event.PoolAddress == (common.Address{}) ||
!hasValidContract(event.PoolAddress) {
s.logger.Debug("Skipping invalid pool address")
return
}
// Check contract exists before attempting to fetch data
poolData, err := marketScanner.GetPoolData(event.PoolAddress.Hex())
```
### Implementation Status
- ✅ Identified root cause
- ✅ Documented error patterns
- ⏳ Need to: Implement contract existence check before RPC calls
---
## Critical Issue #2: Multi-Hop Scanner Finding 0 Paths
### Root Cause
The `ScanForArbitrage` function in `pkg/arbitrage/multihop.go` uses placeholder liquidity values:
```go
// Line 485: Hardcoded placeholder value!
uint256.NewInt(1000000000000000000) // 1 ETH - not real pool liquidity
```
When calculating swap outputs, the path creation fails because:
1. Placeholder reserves don't match actual pool state
2. `calculateSwapOutput()` fails with placeholder data
3. Returns `nil` paths silently
### Current Log Output
```
Multi-hop arbitrage scan completed in 99.983µs: found 0 profitable paths out of 0 total paths
Detected: 0, Executed: 0, Successful: 0, Success Rate: 0.00%
```
### Solution
Replace placeholder liquidity with real pool data:
```go
// Get actual pool reserves instead of hardcoded values
reserve0, reserve1, err := f.getPoolLiquidity(pool)
if err != nil {
// Log and skip invalid pools
mhs.logger.Debug("Could not get pool liquidity", "pool", pool.Hex(), "error", err)
continue
}
// Use real reserves for profit calculation
outputAmount, err := mhs.calculateSwapOutput(
inputAmount,
reserve0, // Real values, not placeholders
reserve1,
fee,
)
```
### Implementation Status
- ✅ Identified placeholder hardcoding
- ✅ Located in `multihop.go:238-260` (createArbitragePath)
- ⏳ Need to: Fetch actual pool reserves before calculations
---
## Critical Issue #3: Security Manager Disabled
### Location
`cmd/mev-bot/main.go:141` - Commented out during debugging
### Impact
- No transaction validation
- No rate limiting enforcement
- No audit logging of execution
- Running without safeguards
### Fix
Re-enable and test security manager:
```go
// Un-comment and test:
// securityMgr := security.NewSecurityManager(...)
// arbitrageService.SetSecurityManager(securityMgr)
```
---
## Critical Issue #4: Zero Arbitrage Executions
### Current Status
```
Arbitrage Service Stats - Detected: 0, Executed: 0, Successful: 0
```
### Root Causes (Cascading)
1. **Invalid pool addresses** → Invalid swap calculations
2. **Placeholder liquidity** → Paths return 0 profit
3. **Security manager disabled** → Even if paths found, won't execute
4. **Multi-hop scanner** → Finding 0 paths = 0 opportunities
### Solution Path
1. Fix pool validation (Issue #1)
2. Replace placeholder liquidity (Issue #2)
3. Re-enable security manager (Issue #3)
4. Test end-to-end on Anvil fork
---
## Production Deployment Checklist
### Phase 1: Core Fixes (Day 1)
- [ ] Implement contract existence check for pool addresses
- [ ] Replace placeholder liquidity with real pool data
- [ ] Fix pool address extraction from swap logs
- [ ] Re-enable security manager with proper config
### Phase 2: Testing (Day 2)
- [ ] Deploy on Anvil fork of Arbitrum
- [ ] Test pool validation with known Uniswap V3 pools
- [ ] Test multi-hop scanner with real liquidity
- [ ] Run end-to-end arbitrage detection
### Phase 3: Hardening (Day 3)
- [ ] Clear invalid pools from blacklist
- [ ] Set up wallet with test ETH
- [ ] Configure execution safeguards
- [ ] Test dry-run mode before live execution
### Phase 4: Monitoring (Day 4)
- [ ] Enable health monitoring alerts
- [ ] Set up log rotation and archiving
- [ ] Configure RPC failover validation
- [ ] Document runbook for operations
---
## Anvil Fork Setup (Completed)
✅ Anvil fork running on http://127.0.0.1:8545
✅ Forked from Arbitrum mainnet
✅ Test account: 0xf39Fd6e51aad88F6F4ce6aB8827279cfffb92266
### Testing Pool Validation
```bash
# Real Uniswap V3 WETH/USDC pool on Arbitrum
POOL="0xC6962004f452bE9203591991D15f6b388e09E8D0"
# This should return valid data (currently returns error)
curl http://127.0.0.1:8545 -X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"jsonrpc":"2.0",
"method":"eth_call",
"params":[{"to":"POOL","data":"0xd21220a7"},"latest"],
"id":1
}'
```
---
## Security Audit Compliance
### C-01: Hardcoded RPC Credentials ✅ FIXED
- Removed from code, all credentials now from env/config
### C-02: Exposed Alchemy API Key ✅ FIXED
- Removed from scripts, loaded from config
### C-03: Placeholder Authentication ⏳ IN PROGRESS
- Removed stub auth methods
- Needs integration test
### C-04: Weak Keystore Derivation ⏳ IN PROGRESS
- Still using LightScryptN (testing-only)
- Need to restore StandardScryptN for production
### C-05: Unsafe Legacy Flash-Loan Executor ✅ FIXED
- Using FlashLoanReceiverSecure instead
### C-06: Non-Compilable Contract ✅ FIXED
- Updated ProductionArbitrageExecutor to use AccessControlEnumerable
- Contracts moved to /home/administrator/projects/Mev-Alpha/
---
## Infrastructure Changes
### Contract Repository Organization
```
Before:
/home/administrator/projects/mev-beta/contracts/ (mixed with Go code)
After:
/home/administrator/projects/Mev-Alpha/ (dedicated Solidity project)
├── contracts/
│ ├── ProductionArbitrageExecutor.sol (fixed C-06)
│ ├── DataFetcher.sol (new - batch pool data fetching)
│ ├── PoolDetector.sol
│ └── balancer/
├── foundry.toml
├── lib/ (OpenZeppelin, forge-std)
└── out/ (compiled artifacts)
```
---
## Next Steps
### Immediate (Next Session)
1. Implement contract existence check before pool queries
2. Replace placeholder reserves with real pool data
3. Test multi-hop scanner with real liquidity
4. Re-enable security manager
### Short-term (Production)
1. Clear invalid pools from blacklist
2. Deploy on Anvil fork
3. Test full arbitrage pipeline
4. Set up monitoring and alerts
### Long-term (Scalability)
1. Implement persistent opportunity database
2. Add MEV protection (Flashbots)
3. Support additional L2s (Optimism, Base)
4. Machine learning opportunity prediction
---
**Status**: Architecture sound, execution blockers identified and documented.
**ETA to Production**: 3-5 days with focused implementation
**Risk Level**: Medium (blockers are fixable, not architectural)