850223a953
- Added comprehensive bounds checking to prevent buffer overruns in multicall parsing - Implemented graduated validation system (Strict/Moderate/Permissive) to reduce false positives - Added LRU caching system for address validation with 10-minute TTL - Enhanced ABI decoder with missing Universal Router and Arbitrum-specific DEX signatures - Fixed duplicate function declarations and import conflicts across multiple files - Added error recovery mechanisms with multiple fallback strategies - Updated tests to handle new validation behavior for suspicious addresses - Fixed parser test expectations for improved validation system - Applied gofmt formatting fixes to ensure code style compliance - Fixed mutex copying issues in monitoring package by introducing MetricsSnapshot - Resolved critical security vulnerabilities in heuristic address extraction - Progress: Updated TODO audit from 10% to 35% complete 🤖 Generated with [Claude Code](https://claude.com/claude-code) Co-Authored-By: Claude <noreply@anthropic.com>
322 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
322 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# Security Audit Fix TODO List
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**Generated from:** MEV Bot Comprehensive Security Audit (October 9, 2025)
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**Priority Order:** Critical → High → Medium → Low
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---
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## 🔴 CRITICAL PRIORITY (Fix Before ANY Deployment)
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### CRITICAL-001: Integer Overflow Vulnerabilities
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**Status:** ✅ Completed
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**Estimated Time:** 4-6 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Files to Fix:**
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrum/l2_parser.go:827` - uint64 to uint32 conversion
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- [x] `pkg/validation/input_validator.go:556` - Gas calculation overflow
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- [x] `pkg/validation/input_validator.go:552` - Gas calculation overflow
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- [x] `pkg/transport/benchmarks.go:271` - Memory usage calculation
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- [x] `pkg/security/transaction_security.go:248` - Gas cost calculation
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- [x] `pkg/profitcalc/profit_calc.go:251` - Gas limit conversion
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- [x] `pkg/profitcalc/profit_calc.go:178` - Additional gas cost
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- [x] `pkg/mev/competition.go:207` - Total cost calculation
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- [x] `pkg/mev/competition.go:179` - Total cost calculation
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- [x] `pkg/mev/competition.go:144` - Gas cost calculation
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- [x] `pkg/math/arbitrage_calculator.go:296` - Total gas conversion
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- [x] `pkg/contracts/executor.go:364` - Nonce conversion
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrum/profitability_tracker.go:479` - Average profit calculation
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**Implementation Tasks:**
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- [x] Create `pkg/security/safe_conversions.go` with safe conversion functions
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- [x] Add bounds checking for all uint64 → uint32/int64 conversions
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- [x] Update all affected calculation functions to use safe conversions
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- [x] Add unit tests for overflow detection
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- [x] Update error handling for conversion failures
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### ✅ CRITICAL-001a: Swap Event Parsing Integer Issues (COMPLETED)
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**Status:** ✅ Fixed
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**Completed:** October 9, 2025
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**Fixed Files:**
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrage/service.go:1167-1168` - Fixed unsigned parsing of signed amount0/amount1
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrage/service.go:1174-1177` - Fixed improper tick conversion from int24
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrage/service.go:1460-1461` - Fixed parseSwapEvent function
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrage/service.go:1467-1470` - Fixed second instance of amount parsing
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrage/service.go:1207-1251` - Added parseSignedInt256 and parseSignedInt24 helper functions
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**What Was Fixed:**
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- Replaced `new(big.Int).SetBytes()` with proper signed integer parsing for UniswapV3 amount0/amount1
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- Fixed tick conversion from int24 stored in int256 format using proper bit manipulation
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- Added comprehensive validation and error handling for all signed integer conversions
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- Implemented two's complement conversion for negative values
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- Added range validation for int24 tick values (-8388608 to 8388607)
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### ✅ CRITICAL-002: Multicall Parsing Corruption Issues (COMPLETED)
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**Status:** ✅ Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 6-8 hours
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**Completed:** October 16, 2025
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**Files Fixed:**
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- [x] `pkg/calldata/multicall.go:366-440` - Heuristic address extraction corruption
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- [x] `pkg/calldata/multicall.go:98-129` - Multicall ABI decoding failures
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- [x] `pkg/calldata/multicall.go:480-494` - Address validation logging spam
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- [x] `pkg/arbitrum/abi_decoder.go:185-238` - Missing multicall signatures
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- [x] `internal/validation/address.go:468-476` - Overly aggressive corruption scoring
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**Implementation Tasks Completed:**
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- [x] Fix bounds checking in heuristicExtractTokens function
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- [x] Add missing Universal Router and multicall signatures to ABI decoder
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- [x] Implement graduated validation thresholds (15/30/50 for different operations)
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- [x] Add proper error recovery for partial multicall parsing failures
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- [x] Implement caching for known good/bad address patterns
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- [x] Add structured logging for multicall parsing diagnostics
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**What Was Fixed:**
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- Enhanced bounds checking prevents buffer overruns and corrupted address extraction
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- Added comprehensive Universal Router and Arbitrum DEX function signatures
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- Implemented three-tier validation system (Strict/Moderate/Permissive) based on operation context
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- Added multi-layer error recovery with fallback extraction methods
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- Implemented LRU-based caching system to avoid repeated address validation
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- Fixed duplicate function declarations and import cleanup
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**Test Results:**
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- All multicall parsing tests passing
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- Enhanced test coverage for edge cases and suspicious address handling
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- Verified correct rejection of corrupted addresses while allowing legitimate ones
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### CRITICAL-003: Unhandled Error Conditions
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 8-10 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Critical Error Handling Fixes:**
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/shutdown_manager.go:460` - OnShutdownCompleted hook
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/shutdown_manager.go:457` - OnShutdownFailed hook
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/shutdown_manager.go:396` - ForceShutdown call
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/shutdown_manager.go:388` - ForceShutdown in timeout
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/shutdown_manager.go:192` - StopAll call
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/module_registry.go:729-733` - Event publishing
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/module_registry.go:646-653` - Module started event
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/module_registry.go:641` - Health monitoring start
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/health_monitor.go:550` - Health change notification
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- [ ] `pkg/lifecycle/health_monitor.go:444` - System health notification
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**Implementation Tasks:**
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- [ ] Add proper error handling and logging for all identified locations
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- [ ] Implement graceful degradation for non-critical failures
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- [ ] Add retry mechanisms where appropriate
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- [ ] Create error aggregation and reporting system
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- [ ] Add monitoring alerts for repeated failures
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---
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## 🟠 HIGH PRIORITY (Fix Before Production)
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### HIGH-001: Private Key Memory Security
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 2-3 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Enhance `clearPrivateKey()` function in `pkg/security/keymanager.go`
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- [ ] Implement secure memory zeroing for big.Int private key data
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- [ ] Add memory protection for key material during operations
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- [ ] Create unit tests for memory clearing verification
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- [ ] Add memory usage monitoring for key operations
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### HIGH-002: Race Condition Fixes
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 4-5 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Files to Review:**
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- [ ] `pkg/security/keymanager.go:481,526,531` - Atomic operation consistency
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- [ ] `pkg/arbitrage/service.go` - Shared state protection
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- [ ] `pkg/scanner/concurrent.go` - Worker pool synchronization
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- [ ] `pkg/transport/provider_manager.go` - Connection state management
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Review all shared state access patterns
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- [ ] Replace inconsistent atomic usage with proper synchronization
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- [ ] Add race detection tests to CI pipeline
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- [ ] Implement proper read-write lock usage where needed
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### HIGH-003: Chain ID Validation Enhancement
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 2 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Add comprehensive chain ID validation in transaction signing
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- [ ] Implement EIP-155 replay protection verification
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- [ ] Add chain ID mismatch detection and alerts
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- [ ] Create tests for cross-chain replay attack prevention
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---
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## 🟡 MEDIUM PRIORITY (Security Improvements)
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### MEDIUM-001: Rate Limiting Enhancement
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 3-4 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Implement sliding window rate limiting in `pkg/security/keymanager.go:781-823`
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- [ ] Add distributed rate limiting support for multiple instances
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- [ ] Implement adaptive rate limiting based on system load
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- [ ] Add rate limiting bypass detection and alerting
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### MEDIUM-002: Input Validation Strengthening
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 4-5 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Enhance ABI decoding validation throughout parsing modules
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- [ ] Add comprehensive bounds checking for external data
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- [ ] Implement input sanitization for log messages
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- [ ] Create fuzzing test suite for all input validation functions
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### MEDIUM-003: Sensitive Information Logging
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 2-3 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Implement log sanitization for addresses and transaction data
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- [ ] Add configurable log level filtering for sensitive information
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- [ ] Create secure audit logging format
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- [ ] Implement log encryption for sensitive audit trails
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---
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## 🟢 LOW PRIORITY (Code Quality & Maintenance)
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### LOW-001: Code Quality Improvements
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 6-8 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Static Analysis Fixes:**
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- [ ] Fix unused function warnings from staticcheck
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- [ ] Remove dead code and unused variables
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- [ ] Improve error message formatting (capitalization)
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- [ ] Add missing documentation for exported functions
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### LOW-002: Testing Infrastructure
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 8-10 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Expand fuzzing test coverage for all critical components
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- [ ] Add property-based testing for mathematical operations
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- [ ] Implement integration security test suite
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- [ ] Create performance regression tests for security features
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### LOW-003: Monitoring & Observability
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**Status:** ❌ Not Fixed
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**Estimated Time:** 6-8 hours
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**Assigned:** TBD
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**Tasks:**
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- [ ] Add security event metrics and dashboards
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- [ ] Implement anomaly detection for unusual transaction patterns
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- [ ] Create security audit log analysis tools
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- [ ] Add performance monitoring for security operations
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---
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## 📋 Implementation Plan
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### Phase 1: Critical Fixes (Week 1)
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**Total Estimated Time:** 18-24 hours
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1. Integer overflow vulnerability fixes
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2. Multicall parsing corruption fixes
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3. Critical error handling implementation
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4. Basic testing for critical fixes
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### Phase 2: High Priority Security (Week 2)
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**Total Estimated Time:** 8-10 hours
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1. Private key memory security enhancements
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2. Race condition fixes
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3. Chain ID validation improvements
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### Phase 3: Medium Priority Improvements (Week 3-4)
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**Total Estimated Time:** 9-12 hours
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1. Rate limiting enhancements
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2. Input validation strengthening
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3. Logging security improvements
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### Phase 4: Quality & Maintenance (Ongoing)
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**Total Estimated Time:** 20-26 hours
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1. Code quality improvements
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2. Testing infrastructure expansion
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3. Monitoring and observability enhancements
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---
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## 🧪 Testing Requirements
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### Required Tests for Each Fix:
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- [ ] Unit tests for all modified functions
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- [ ] Integration tests for security flows
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- [ ] Regression tests for existing functionality
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- [ ] Performance tests to ensure no degradation
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- [ ] Security-specific test cases for vulnerability verification
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### Automated Testing Pipeline:
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- [ ] Add security linting to pre-commit hooks
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- [ ] Include fuzzing tests in CI pipeline
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- [ ] Add race detection to all test runs
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- [ ] Implement security regression testing
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---
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## 📊 Progress Tracking
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### Overall Progress: 35% Complete 🟢
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**Critical:** 2/4 ✅ (Swap parsing + Multicall parsing fixed)
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**High:** 0/3 ❌
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**Medium:** 0/3 ❌
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**Low:** 0/3 ❌
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### Milestones:
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- [x] **Milestone 0:** Swap event parsing fixes (Critical subset) ✅
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- [x] **Milestone 0.5:** Multicall parsing corruption analysis and fix plan ✅
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- [x] **Milestone 1:** Multicall parsing corruption fixes implemented and tested ✅
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- [ ] **Milestone 2:** All critical fixes implemented and tested
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- [ ] **Milestone 2:** High priority security improvements complete
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- [ ] **Milestone 3:** Medium priority enhancements deployed
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- [ ] **Milestone 4:** Low priority improvements and maintenance complete
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---
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## 💡 Notes & Reminders
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- **Before starting:** Create feature branch for security fixes
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- **Testing approach:** Fix → Test → Review → Deploy
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- **Code review:** All security fixes require peer review
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- **Documentation:** Update security documentation after each phase
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- **Rollback plan:** Maintain ability to rollback any changes quickly
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**Next Steps:**
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1. Assign team members to critical priority items
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2. Set up dedicated security-fixes branch
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3. Begin with multicall parsing fixes (immediate impact on arbitrage detection)
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4. Continue with integer overflow fixes (highest security impact)
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5. Implement comprehensive testing for each fix
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6. Schedule code reviews for all security modifications
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**Recent Updates:**
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- **October 16, 2025:** Added CRITICAL-002 for multicall parsing corruption issues
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- **October 16, 2025:** Completed comprehensive analysis of multicall parsing failures
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- **October 16, 2025:** Identified root cause: heuristic address extraction generating corrupted addresses
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---
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**Last Updated:** October 16, 2025
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**Review Schedule:** Weekly during active fixes, monthly after completion
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