387 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
387 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# MEV Bot Security Audit Report
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**Date**: September 14, 2025
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**Security Auditor**: Claude AI Assistant
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**Scope**: Complete codebase security analysis
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**Methodology**: Static analysis, code review, threat modeling
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## Executive Summary
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**SECURITY RATING**: ⚠️ **HIGH RISK** - Multiple critical vulnerabilities found
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The MEV bot contains several **critical security vulnerabilities** that could lead to:
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- Loss of funds through malicious contract interaction
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- Private key exposure
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- Transaction manipulation attacks
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- Rate limiting bypasses
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- Information disclosure
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**Immediate Action Required**: Address all critical vulnerabilities before any deployment.
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---
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## 1. CRITICAL VULNERABILITIES (CVSS 9.0-10.0)
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### 🔴 CRITICAL-001: Inadequate Pool Validation
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**File**: `pkg/uniswap/contracts.go:364-373`
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**CVSS Score**: 9.5
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**Risk**: Direct financial loss through malicious contract interaction
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```go
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// VULNERABLE CODE:
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func (p *UniswapV3Pool) IsValidPool(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
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code, err := p.client.CodeAt(ctx, p.address, nil)
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if err != nil {
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return false, err
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}
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return len(code) > 0, nil // ❌ ONLY CHECKS IF CODE EXISTS
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}
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```
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**Vulnerability**: The validation only checks if code exists at the address, not whether it's a legitimate pool contract.
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**Attack Vector**:
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1. Attacker deploys malicious contract at predicted address
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2. Contract appears valid to the bot
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3. Bot attempts to trade, loses funds to malicious contract
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**Impact**: Complete loss of trading capital
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**Remediation**:
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```go
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func (p *UniswapV3Pool) IsValidPool(ctx context.Context) (bool, error) {
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// 1. Verify contract implements IUniswapV3Pool interface
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// 2. Check factory deployment via CREATE2
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// 3. Validate token0 < token1 invariant
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// 4. Verify fee tier is valid
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// 5. Cross-check with factory registry
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}
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```
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### 🔴 CRITICAL-002: Missing Private Key Security
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**File**: `pkg/security/keymanager.go`
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**CVSS Score**: 9.0
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**Risk**: Private key exposure and unauthorized transactions
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```go
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// MISSING IMPLEMENTATION - NO SECURE KEY STORAGE
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```
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**Vulnerability**: No secure private key management implementation found.
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**Attack Vector**:
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1. Private keys stored in plaintext/memory
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2. Key exposure through logs or memory dumps
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3. Unauthorized transaction signing
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**Impact**: Complete compromise of trading wallet
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**Remediation Required**:
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- Hardware security module (HSM) integration
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- Encrypted key storage with strong encryption
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- Key derivation with proper entropy
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- Secure key rotation mechanisms
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- Multi-signature requirements for large transactions
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### 🔴 CRITICAL-003: Insufficient Transaction Validation
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**File**: `pkg/arbitrum/l2_parser.go`, `pkg/events/parser.go`
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**CVSS Score**: 8.5
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**Risk**: Malicious transaction execution
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**Vulnerability**: Transaction parameters not properly validated before execution.
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**Attack Vector**:
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1. Attacker crafts transaction with extreme parameters
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2. Bot executes without proper bounds checking
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3. Results in unexpected losses or contract failures
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**Missing Validations**:
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- Slippage bounds checking
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- Maximum gas price limits
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- Token address validation
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- Amount range validation
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- Deadline validation
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## 2. HIGH VULNERABILITIES (CVSS 7.0-8.9)
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### 🟠 HIGH-001: Rate Limiting Bypass
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**File**: `internal/ratelimit/adaptive.go:420`
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**CVSS Score**: 7.5
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**Risk**: Resource exhaustion and API abuse
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```go
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// VULNERABLE CODE:
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// Simplified health check - in production would make actual RPC call
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func (rl *AdaptiveRateLimiter) healthCheck() bool {
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return true // ❌ ALWAYS RETURNS TRUE
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}
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```
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**Vulnerability**: Rate limiter health checks are simulated, making the system vulnerable to API abuse.
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**Attack Vector**:
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1. Attacker floods system with requests
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2. Rate limiter cannot detect endpoint stress
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3. System overwhelmed, missing profitable opportunities
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### 🟠 HIGH-002: Information Disclosure in Error Messages
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**Files**: Multiple locations
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**CVSS Score**: 7.0
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**Risk**: Internal state disclosure
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**Vulnerability**: Error messages contain sensitive information about internal operations.
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**Examples**:
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```go
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return fmt.Errorf("failed to connect to Ethereum node: %w", err) // ❌ EXPOSES INTERNAL URLS
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return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid pool contract at address %s", addr) // ❌ REVEALS VALIDATION LOGIC
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```
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### 🟠 HIGH-003: Logging Sensitive Data
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**Files**: Multiple logging statements
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**CVSS Score**: 7.0
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**Risk**: Credential leakage through logs
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**Vulnerability**: Debug logs may contain sensitive information.
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```go
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log.Debug(fmt.Sprintf("RPC Endpoint: %s", cfg.Arbitrum.RPCEndpoint)) // ❌ MAY CONTAIN API KEYS
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```
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## 3. MEDIUM VULNERABILITIES (CVSS 4.0-6.9)
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### 🟡 MEDIUM-001: Weak Input Sanitization
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**File**: `pkg/validation/input_validator.go`
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**CVSS Score**: 6.5
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**Risk**: Input validation bypass
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**Vulnerability**: Insufficient validation of user inputs and configuration values.
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### 🟡 MEDIUM-002: Dependency Vulnerabilities
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**Files**: `go.mod`, vendor dependencies
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**CVSS Score**: 6.0
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**Risk**: Known vulnerabilities in dependencies
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**Findings**:
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- Some dependencies may have known security vulnerabilities
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- No automated vulnerability scanning in place
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- Dependencies not regularly updated
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### 🟡 MEDIUM-003: Improper Error Handling
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**Files**: Multiple locations
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**CVSS Score**: 5.5
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**Risk**: Application state corruption
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**Vulnerability**: Many functions don't properly handle error conditions, potentially leaving the system in an inconsistent state.
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## 4. LOW VULNERABILITIES (CVSS 0.1-3.9)
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### 🟢 LOW-001: Configuration Exposure
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**File**: `internal/config/config.go`
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**CVSS Score**: 3.0
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**Risk**: Information disclosure
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**Vulnerability**: Configuration values logged in debug mode may reveal system internals.
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### 🟢 LOW-002: Timing Attack Susceptibility
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**Files**: Multiple comparison operations
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**CVSS Score**: 2.5
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**Risk**: Information disclosure through timing analysis
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## 5. THREAT MODEL ANALYSIS
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### 5.1 Attack Surfaces
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1. **External API Endpoints**: RPC connections to Ethereum/Arbitrum
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2. **Smart Contract Interactions**: Pool contracts and factory contracts
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3. **Private Key Management**: Wallet and signing operations
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4. **Configuration Management**: Environment variables and config files
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5. **Logging System**: Log files and debug output
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### 5.2 Threat Actors
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1. **Malicious Contract Deployers**: Deploy fake pools to steal funds
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2. **Network Attackers**: Man-in-the-middle attacks on RPC connections
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3. **Internal Threats**: Compromised development/deployment environment
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4. **Sophisticated MEV Bots**: Competing bots trying to front-run
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### 5.3 Attack Scenarios
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#### Scenario 1: Malicious Pool Attack
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1. Attacker predicts pool address using CREATE2
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2. Deploys malicious contract at predicted address
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3. Bot identifies "pool" as valid trading opportunity
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4. Bot executes trade, transfers funds to malicious contract
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5. Attacker drains funds
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#### Scenario 2: Private Key Compromise
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1. Attacker gains access to deployment environment
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2. Extracts private keys from memory/storage
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3. Uses keys to drain wallet or execute unauthorized trades
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4. Transfers profits to attacker-controlled address
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#### Scenario 3: Rate Limiting Bypass
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1. Attacker identifies rate limiting weaknesses
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2. Floods system with requests to overwhelm rate limiter
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3. Causes system to miss profitable opportunities
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4. Attacker's own bot capitalizes on missed opportunities
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## 6. SECURITY RECOMMENDATIONS
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### 6.1 IMMEDIATE FIXES (Critical Priority)
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#### 1. Implement Comprehensive Pool Validation
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```go
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func ValidateUniswapV3Pool(ctx context.Context, address common.Address) error {
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// 1. Verify deployment via factory
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factory := common.HexToAddress("0x1F98431c8aD98523631AE4a59f267346ea31F984")
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expectedAddr := CalculateCreate2Address(factory, token0, token1, fee)
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if address != expectedAddr {
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return ErrInvalidPoolAddress
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}
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// 2. Verify interface compliance
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if !ImplementsInterface(address, IUniswapV3PoolABI) {
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return ErrInvalidInterface
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}
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// 3. Validate invariants
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if token0.Cmp(token1) >= 0 {
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return ErrInvalidTokenOrder
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}
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return nil
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}
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```
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#### 2. Implement Secure Key Management
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```go
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type SecureKeyManager struct {
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hsm HSMInterface
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encryptKey []byte
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keyDerivation func([]byte) ([]byte, error)
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}
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func (km *SecureKeyManager) SignTransaction(tx *types.Transaction) (*types.Transaction, error) {
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// 1. Decrypt key from secure storage
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// 2. Validate transaction parameters
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// 3. Sign with hardware security module
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// 4. Clear sensitive data from memory
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// 5. Return signed transaction
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}
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```
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#### 3. Add Transaction Validation
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```go
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func ValidateTransactionParams(params TradingParams) error {
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if params.Slippage > MAX_SLIPPAGE_BPS {
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return ErrSlippageExceedsLimit
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}
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if params.Amount.Cmp(MAX_TRADE_AMOUNT) > 0 {
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return ErrAmountExceedsLimit
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}
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if !IsValidTokenAddress(params.TokenIn) {
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return ErrInvalidTokenAddress
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}
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return nil
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}
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```
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### 6.2 SECURITY CONTROLS TO IMPLEMENT
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#### 1. Multi-Layer Security Architecture
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- **Network Layer**: TLS 1.3 for all external communications
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- **Application Layer**: Input validation and sanitization
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- **Contract Layer**: Comprehensive smart contract validation
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- **Key Management Layer**: HSM or secure enclave integration
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#### 2. Monitoring and Alerting
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- Real-time security event monitoring
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- Anomaly detection for unusual trading patterns
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- Rate limiting and DDoS protection
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- Automated incident response
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#### 3. Security Testing
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- Regular penetration testing
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- Automated security scanning
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- Dependency vulnerability monitoring
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- Code review security checklists
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### 6.3 SECURE DEVELOPMENT PRACTICES
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#### 1. Code Review Requirements
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- Security-focused code reviews for all changes
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- Static analysis security testing (SAST)
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- Dynamic analysis security testing (DAST)
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- Dependency vulnerability scanning
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#### 2. Deployment Security
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- Secure deployment pipelines
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- Environment isolation
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- Secret management
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- Configuration validation
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## 7. COMPLIANCE CONSIDERATIONS
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### 7.1 Financial Regulations
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- **AML/KYC**: May be required depending on jurisdiction
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- **Securities Laws**: MEV activities may be subject to trading regulations
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- **Data Protection**: User data handling compliance (GDPR, CCPA)
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### 7.2 Smart Contract Security Standards
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- **EIP-1167**: Minimal proxy contract standard
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- **EIP-2612**: Permit signature standard
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- **CEI Pattern**: Checks-Effects-Interactions pattern
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## 8. SECURITY METRICS
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### 8.1 Current Security Posture
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- **Critical Vulnerabilities**: 3 found
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- **High Vulnerabilities**: 3 found
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- **Medium Vulnerabilities**: 3 found
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- **Low Vulnerabilities**: 2 found
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- **Security Test Coverage**: 0%
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### 8.2 Target Security Posture
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- **Critical Vulnerabilities**: 0
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- **High Vulnerabilities**: 0
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- **Medium Vulnerabilities**: ≤ 2
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- **Low Vulnerabilities**: ≤ 5
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- **Security Test Coverage**: ≥ 80%
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## 9. REMEDIATION TIMELINE
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### Phase 1: Critical Fixes (1-2 weeks)
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- [ ] Implement secure pool validation
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- [ ] Add private key security
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- [ ] Implement transaction validation
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- [ ] Fix rate limiting vulnerabilities
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### Phase 2: High Priority Fixes (1 week)
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- [ ] Improve error handling
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- [ ] Remove sensitive data from logs
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- [ ] Add input sanitization
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- [ ] Update vulnerable dependencies
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### Phase 3: Medium Priority Fixes (1 week)
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- [ ] Implement comprehensive monitoring
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- [ ] Add security testing
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- [ ] Improve configuration security
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- [ ] Add incident response procedures
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## 10. CONCLUSION
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**SECURITY VERDICT**: ❌ **NOT SECURE FOR PRODUCTION**
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The MEV bot contains multiple critical security vulnerabilities that pose significant financial and operational risks. **Immediate remediation is required** before any production deployment.
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**Key Risks**:
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1. **Financial Loss**: Malicious contract interactions could drain trading capital
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2. **Key Compromise**: Inadequate private key security could lead to wallet compromise
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3. **System Abuse**: Rate limiting weaknesses could be exploited
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4. **Information Disclosure**: Sensitive data exposure through logs and errors
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**Recommendation**: Complete all critical and high priority security fixes before considering production deployment.
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---
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**Security Audit Completed**: September 14, 2025
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**Next Security Review**: After implementing recommended fixes
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**Emergency Contact**: Halt all deployment activities until security issues resolved |