449 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
449 lines
12 KiB
Markdown
# COMPREHENSIVE CODEBASE AUDIT REPORT
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## Copper Tone Technologies (coppertone.tech)
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**Audit Date:** November 23, 2025
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**Audit Duration:** 39 seconds (automated) + manual review
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**Auditor:** Claude Code
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---
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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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This comprehensive audit evaluated the Copper Tone Technologies platform across security, code quality, architecture, and infrastructure. The codebase demonstrates **solid security fundamentals** with recent improvements including rate limiting, security headers, and XSS protection. However, several areas require attention before production deployment.
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### Overall Assessment: **GOOD with Improvements Needed**
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| Category | Grade | Notes |
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|----------|-------|-------|
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| Security | B+ | Rate limiting, security headers added; JWT implementation solid |
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| Code Quality | B | Error handling good; low test coverage concerning |
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| Architecture | B+ | Clean microservice separation; good patterns |
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| Infrastructure | B | Containerization solid; needs monitoring |
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| Documentation | A- | API docs comprehensive; inline comments adequate |
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### Issue Summary
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| Severity | Count | Status |
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|----------|-------|--------|
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| CRITICAL | 0 | None found |
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| HIGH | 3 | Require attention |
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| MEDIUM | 8 | Should fix soon |
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| LOW | 12 | Track for improvement |
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| INFO | 5 | Observations |
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---
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## CRITICAL FINDINGS
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**None identified.** Previous critical issues (hardcoded passwords, missing rate limiting, XSS vulnerabilities) have been addressed in recent commits.
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---
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## HIGH SEVERITY FINDINGS
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### [HIGH-001] Low Test Coverage Across Backend Services
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**Files:** All backend services
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**Coverage:**
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- auth-service: 5.2%
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- blog-service: 0.0%
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- contact-service: 0.0%
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- forum-service: 0.0%
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- payment-service: 0.0%
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- work-management-service: 0.0%
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**Impact:**
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- Regressions may go undetected
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- Refactoring becomes risky
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- CI/CD cannot catch breaking changes
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**Remediation:**
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```bash
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# Minimum target: 60% coverage for critical paths
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# Priority functions to test:
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# - Authentication handlers
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# - Payment processing
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# - Authorization middleware
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# - Database operations
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```
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---
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### [HIGH-002] No Refresh Token Implementation
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**Files:** `auth-service/main.go`
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**Description:**
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JWT tokens expire after 24 hours with no refresh mechanism. Users will be abruptly logged out.
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**Evidence:**
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```go
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// auth-service/main.go:1217
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"exp": time.Now().Add(time.Hour * 24).Unix(),
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```
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**Impact:**
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- Poor user experience (session expires without warning)
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- No secure way to extend sessions
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- Forces re-authentication frequently
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**Remediation:**
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Implement refresh token flow:
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1. Issue short-lived access tokens (15-30 min)
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2. Issue long-lived refresh tokens (7-30 days) stored securely
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3. Add `/auth/refresh` endpoint
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4. Store refresh tokens in HttpOnly cookies or secure storage
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---
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### [HIGH-003] Missing Rate Limiting on Other Services
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**Files:** `blog-service`, `forum-service`, `payment-service`, `work-management-service`, `contact-service`
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**Description:**
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Rate limiting was added to auth-service but other services lack protection against abuse.
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**Impact:**
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- DoS vulnerability on unprotected endpoints
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- Resource exhaustion attacks possible
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- Potential for brute-force on any data enumeration
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**Remediation:**
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Add rate limiting middleware to all services, particularly:
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- Contact form submission (prevent spam)
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- Forum posts (prevent flooding)
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- Payment endpoints (prevent enumeration)
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- Blog creation (prevent abuse)
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---
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## MEDIUM SEVERITY FINDINGS
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### [MEDIUM-001] In-Memory Rate Limiter Not Suitable for Production
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**File:** `auth-service/main.go:35-127`
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**Description:**
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Current rate limiter uses in-memory maps, which don't persist across restarts and don't work in multi-instance deployments.
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**Remediation:**
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For production, use Redis-backed rate limiting:
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```go
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// Example with go-redis
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rdb := redis.NewClient(&redis.Options{Addr: "localhost:6379"})
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limiter := redis_rate.NewLimiter(rdb)
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```
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---
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### [MEDIUM-002] log.Fatal Prevents Graceful Shutdown
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**Files:** All Go services (56 occurrences)
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**Description:**
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`log.Fatal` calls `os.Exit(1)` immediately, bypassing `defer` statements and preventing graceful cleanup.
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**Evidence:**
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```go
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// payment-service/main.go:132
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log.Fatal(server.ListenAndServe())
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```
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**Impact:**
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- Database connections may not close properly
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- In-flight requests terminated abruptly
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- Resources not released
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**Remediation:**
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Use proper signal handling:
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```go
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go func() {
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if err := server.ListenAndServe(); err != http.ErrServerClosed {
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log.Printf("Server error: %v", err)
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}
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}()
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quit := make(chan os.Signal, 1)
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signal.Notify(quit, syscall.SIGINT, syscall.SIGTERM)
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<-quit
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ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
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defer cancel()
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server.Shutdown(ctx)
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```
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---
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### [MEDIUM-003] Missing Input Length Validation in Some Endpoints
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**Files:** `forum-service/main.go`, `blog-service/main.go`
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**Description:**
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While auth-service has comprehensive input validation, other services may accept unbounded input.
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**Remediation:**
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Add validation for:
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- Forum post content (max length)
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- Blog content (max length)
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- Comment text (max length)
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- File upload sizes
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---
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### [MEDIUM-004] CSRF Protection Not Implemented
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**Files:** All backend services
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**Description:**
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State-changing operations rely solely on JWT tokens. While CORS restricts origins, CSRF tokens add defense-in-depth.
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**Remediation:**
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For critical operations (password change, payment), implement:
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1. CSRF token generation on form load
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2. Token validation on submission
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3. Double-submit cookie pattern as alternative
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---
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### [MEDIUM-005] Sensitive Data in localStorage
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**File:** `frontend/src/stores/auth.ts:169`
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**Description:**
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JWT tokens stored in localStorage are vulnerable to XSS attacks.
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**Evidence:**
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```typescript
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const token = ref<string | null>(localStorage.getItem('auth_token'))
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```
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**Impact:**
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If XSS occurs (now mitigated by DOMPurify), tokens could be stolen.
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**Remediation:**
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Consider HttpOnly cookies for token storage, or implement token binding.
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---
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### [MEDIUM-006] Missing Health Check Endpoints
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**Files:** Most services
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**Description:**
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Only basic health checks exist. Need comprehensive checks for:
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- Database connectivity
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- External service availability
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- Resource utilization
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**Remediation:**
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```go
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func healthHandler(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
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checks := map[string]string{
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"database": checkDB(),
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"memory": checkMemory(),
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"disk": checkDisk(),
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}
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// Return appropriate status based on checks
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}
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```
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---
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### [MEDIUM-007] No Database Connection Pool Limits
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**Files:** All services using `sql.Open()`
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**Description:**
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Connection pools have no explicit limits, which could exhaust database connections under load.
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**Remediation:**
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```go
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db.SetMaxOpenConns(25)
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db.SetMaxIdleConns(5)
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db.SetConnMaxLifetime(5 * time.Minute)
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```
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---
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### [MEDIUM-008] Missing Audit Trail for Sensitive Operations
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**Description:**
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While some security events are logged, there's no comprehensive audit trail for:
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- User role changes
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- Data deletions
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- Payment operations
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- Configuration changes
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**Remediation:**
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Create audit_log table and middleware to capture:
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- Who (user ID)
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- What (action)
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- When (timestamp)
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- Where (IP, user agent)
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- Result (success/failure)
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---
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## LOW SEVERITY FINDINGS
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### [LOW-001] Secrets in Test Files (Expected)
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Test files contain mock tokens and passwords - acceptable for testing.
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### [LOW-002] Private Keys in Dependencies (Expected)
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Found in `.gopath/pkg/mod/` - these are from third-party test fixtures.
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### [LOW-003] Missing go.sum Verification
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`go mod verify` should run in CI to ensure dependency integrity.
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### [LOW-004] Inconsistent Error Messages
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Some endpoints return detailed errors, others generic. Standardize for consistency.
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### [LOW-005] TODO Comments Need Resolution
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Found TODOs in codebase that should be tracked as issues.
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### [LOW-006] Console.log Statements in Production Code
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Frontend has debug logging that should be removed or conditionally enabled.
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### [LOW-007] Missing Cache Headers on Static Assets
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Frontend assets should have appropriate cache headers.
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### [LOW-008] No Request ID Tracking
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Add correlation IDs for request tracing across services.
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### [LOW-009] Missing HSTS Header
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Add `Strict-Transport-Security` header for HTTPS enforcement.
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### [LOW-010] Container Images Not Pinned
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Use specific image tags instead of `latest`.
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### [LOW-011] Missing Resource Limits in Compose
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Add CPU/memory limits to container definitions.
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### [LOW-012] Accessibility Issues in Frontend
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Some ARIA labels missing, contrast ratios to verify.
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---
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## INFO - OBSERVATIONS
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### [INFO-001] Good Practices Observed
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1. **Security Headers** - Recently added comprehensive headers
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2. **Rate Limiting** - Implemented on auth endpoints
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3. **Password Hashing** - Using bcrypt with default cost
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4. **JWT Implementation** - HMAC signing with secret validation
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5. **SUPERUSER Hierarchy** - Well-designed permission system
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6. **XSS Protection** - DOMPurify integrated
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7. **Input Validation** - Comprehensive in auth-service
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8. **CORS Configuration** - Properly restrictive
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### [INFO-002] Architecture Strengths
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1. Clean microservice separation
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2. PostgreSQL schema separation (dev/test/prod)
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3. Multi-modal authentication (email + blockchain)
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4. PWA capabilities
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5. Container-first development
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### [INFO-003] Documentation Quality
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1. Comprehensive CLAUDE.md
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2. Detailed API documentation
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3. Git workflow documented
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4. Project phases documented
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---
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## PRIORITIZED REMEDIATION PLAN
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### Immediate (Before Production)
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1. **Add tests for critical paths** - Focus on auth, payment, authorization
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2. **Implement refresh tokens** - Prevent session disruption
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3. **Add rate limiting to all services** - Prevent abuse
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### Short-term (1-2 weeks)
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4. **Implement graceful shutdown** - Replace log.Fatal
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5. **Add Redis-backed rate limiting** - For multi-instance
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6. **Configure connection pool limits** - Prevent exhaustion
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7. **Add comprehensive health checks** - For monitoring
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### Medium-term (1 month)
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8. **Implement audit logging** - Track sensitive operations
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9. **Add CSRF protection** - Defense in depth
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10. **Move tokens to HttpOnly cookies** - Enhanced security
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11. **Add request correlation IDs** - Traceability
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### Ongoing
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12. **Increase test coverage** - Target 60%+ critical paths
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13. **Address TODO comments** - Track as issues
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14. **Regular dependency updates** - Security patches
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15. **Performance optimization** - Based on metrics
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---
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## STATISTICS DASHBOARD
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### Issues by Severity
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```
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CRITICAL: 0 [████████████████████] 0%
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HIGH: 3 [████████████████████] 11%
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MEDIUM: 8 [████████████████████] 29%
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LOW: 12 [████████████████████] 43%
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INFO: 5 [████████████████████] 18%
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```
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### Issues by Category
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```
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Security: 7
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Code Quality: 8
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Architecture: 5
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Infrastructure: 6
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Testing: 2
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```
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### Files with Most Issues
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```
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auth-service/main.go - 4 issues (mostly resolved)
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All services - log.Fatal usage
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Frontend stores - localStorage usage
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```
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### Estimated Remediation Effort
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```
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Immediate items: 2-3 days
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Short-term items: 1-2 weeks
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Medium-term items: 2-3 weeks
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Total: 4-6 weeks of focused work
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```
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---
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## CONCLUSION
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The Copper Tone Technologies codebase demonstrates **professional quality** with recent security improvements addressing major concerns. The most critical issues (hardcoded secrets, XSS, missing rate limiting) have been resolved.
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**Key Strengths:**
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- Solid JWT implementation with proper validation
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- Comprehensive security headers
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- Well-designed permission hierarchy (SUPERUSER/ADMIN/STAFF/CLIENT)
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- Clean microservice architecture
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- Multi-modal authentication (email + blockchain)
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**Primary Concerns:**
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- Very low test coverage across all services
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- Missing refresh token mechanism
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- Rate limiting only on auth-service
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- In-memory rate limiter won't scale
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**Recommendation:** Address HIGH severity items before production deployment. The codebase is well-structured and the fixes are straightforward to implement.
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---
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*Generated by Coppertone.tech Comprehensive Audit Suite*
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*No stone unturned. No feelings spared.*
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*Audit ID: 20251123-COMPREHENSIVE*
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