10 KiB
Comprehensive Codebase Audit Report - Post-Fixes
Generated: November 23, 2025 10:45 AM CST Audit Type: Full-scale security, code quality, and infrastructure audit Codebase: Copper Tone Technologies (coppertone.tech)
Executive Summary
This audit was conducted after implementing several security fixes including refresh token mechanism, rate limiting across all services, graceful shutdown, and database connection pool limits. The codebase shows significant security improvements over the previous audit.
Overall Assessment: B+ (Good with improvements needed)
| Category | Status | Grade |
|---|---|---|
| Authentication/Authorization | Improved | B+ |
| Rate Limiting | Implemented | A |
| XSS Protection | Partially Addressed | B |
| Test Coverage | Low | D |
| Infrastructure Security | Good | B+ |
| Code Quality | Moderate | B |
| Graceful Shutdown | Implemented | A |
| Database Security | Improved | B+ |
Severity Summary
| Severity | Count | Change from Previous |
|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 0 | - |
| HIGH | 3 | ↓ from 3 |
| MEDIUM | 5 | ↓ from 8 |
| LOW | 8 | ↓ from 12 |
| INFO | 4 | ↓ from 5 |
Detailed Findings
HIGH Severity
HIGH-001: Low Test Coverage
Category: Testing Files: All backend services
Description: Test coverage remains critically low across all backend services:
- auth-service: 4.6% (improved from 5.2%)
- blog-service: 0.0%
- forum-service: 0.0%
- contact-service: 0.0%
- work-management-service: ~5%
- payment-service: ~5%
Impact:
- Bugs may go undetected until production
- Difficult to refactor safely
- No regression protection
Remediation: Priority test coverage needed for:
- Authentication flows (login, register, token refresh)
- Payment processing endpoints
- Authorization checks (role-based access)
- Input validation
References:
- OWASP Testing Guide
HIGH-002: v-html Usage Without Complete Sanitization Verification
Category: Security - XSS Files:
frontend/src/views/ArticleDetailView.vue:33frontend/src/views/ServiceDetailView.vue:33
Description:
While DOMPurify sanitization was added via sanitize.ts, the v-html bindings in ArticleDetailView and ServiceDetailView use article.content and service.content directly without visible sanitization in the template.
Evidence:
<div class="article-content" v-html="article.content"></div>
Impact: If the sanitization layer is bypassed or the content source is not sanitized upstream, XSS attacks could execute.
Remediation:
Ensure all v-html content passes through sanitizeHtml() or sanitizeMarkdown() before rendering:
const sanitizedContent = computed(() => sanitizeMarkdown(article.value?.content || ''))
HIGH-003: Missing CSRF Protection
Category: Security - CSRF Files: All backend services
Description: No CSRF tokens are implemented for state-changing operations. While CORS is configured, this alone doesn't prevent CSRF attacks from same-origin requests or if CORS is misconfigured.
Impact: An attacker could potentially trick authenticated users into performing unwanted actions.
Remediation:
- Implement CSRF tokens for all POST/PUT/DELETE requests
- Use SameSite=Strict for session cookies
- Verify Origin/Referer headers
MEDIUM Severity
MED-001: Error Message Information Leakage
Category: Security - Information Disclosure Files:
backend/functions/auth-service/main.go(multiple locations)backend/functions/contact-service/main.go
Description: Some error messages expose internal details like "Invalid signing method" or database error specifics.
Remediation: Return generic error messages to clients, log detailed errors server-side.
MED-002: Missing Input Length Limits on Some Endpoints
Category: Security - Input Validation Files:
backend/functions/blog-service/main.gobackend/functions/forum-service/main.go
Description: Content fields (blog content, forum posts) don't have explicit maximum length validation, potentially allowing very large payloads.
Remediation: Add content length validation:
if len(req.Content) > 100000 { // ~100KB limit
http.Error(w, "Content too large", http.StatusBadRequest)
return
}
MED-003: document.write Usage in Print Functions
Category: Security - XSS Vector Files:
frontend/src/components/trustBusiness/BusinessPlanGenerator.vue:342frontend/src/components/trustBusiness/GovernanceCharterGenerator.vue:453
Description:
document.write() is used for print functionality, which can be a security risk.
Remediation: Consider using a safer print approach or ensure all content is sanitized before writing.
MED-004: Missing Request Body Size Limits
Category: Security - DoS Files: All backend services
Description: No explicit request body size limits configured at the HTTP server level.
Remediation:
Add MaxBytesReader to limit request body size:
r.Body = http.MaxBytesReader(w, r.Body, 1048576) // 1MB limit
MED-005: Secrets in Test Files
Category: Security - Secrets Management Files:
backend/functions/auth-service/main_test.gofrontend/src/stores/__tests__/auth.spec.ts
Description: Test files contain hardcoded passwords like "password123". While in test files, these patterns could be copied to production code.
Remediation: Use clearly fake/test values and add comments indicating they're test-only.
LOW Severity
LOW-001: Missing godoc Comments
Category: Code Quality Files: All backend services
Description: Most exported functions lack godoc-style documentation comments.
LOW-002: Inconsistent Error Handling Patterns
Category: Code Quality Files: Various
Description: Mix of error handling approaches (some return errors, some panic, some log.Fatal).
LOW-003: Magic Numbers in Rate Limiting
Category: Code Quality Files: All services with rate limiting
Description: Rate limit values (30, 100, etc.) are constants but could be configurable via environment variables.
LOW-004: Missing Health Check Standardization
Category: Infrastructure Files: Various services
Description: Health checks inconsistent between services (/health, /healthz, different response formats).
LOW-005: Unused rateLimitMiddleware Function
Category: Code Quality
File: backend/functions/blog-service/main.go:322
Description:
The rateLimitMiddleware function was added but rate limiting is now done in the main handler wrapper.
LOW-006: Duplicate Code - Rate Limiter Implementation
Category: Code Quality Files: All backend services
Description: Rate limiter code is duplicated across all services. Should be extracted to shared package.
LOW-007: Frontend Test Coverage Unknown
Category: Testing
Description: Frontend test coverage metrics not available in current audit scripts.
LOW-008: Missing API Versioning
Category: Architecture
Description: No API versioning strategy (/api/v1/, etc.) implemented.
INFO
INFO-001: Go Modules Updated
All Go dependencies appear to be recent versions with no known CVEs in direct dependencies.
INFO-002: Database Pool Limits Configured
Connection pool limits now properly configured (25 max open, 5 max idle).
INFO-003: Graceful Shutdown Implemented
All services now handle SIGINT/SIGTERM for clean shutdown.
INFO-004: Security Headers Comprehensive
All services now include security headers (X-Content-Type-Options, X-Frame-Options, CSP, etc.).
Improvements Since Last Audit
Implemented Fixes
-
Refresh Token Mechanism ✅
- Short-lived access tokens (15 minutes)
- Secure refresh tokens (7-day, bcrypt hashed)
- Token rotation on refresh
- Logout/logout-all endpoints
-
Rate Limiting ✅
- All services now have rate limiting
- Different limits for read vs write operations
- IP-based tracking with time windows
-
Graceful Shutdown ✅
- All services handle SIGINT/SIGTERM
- 30-second shutdown timeout
- Proper connection draining
-
Database Connection Pool Limits ✅
- MaxOpenConns: 25
- MaxIdleConns: 5
- ConnMaxLifetime: 5 minutes
- ConnMaxIdleTime: 1 minute
-
Security Headers ✅
- X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- X-Frame-Options: DENY
- X-XSS-Protection: 1; mode=block
- Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
- Content-Security-Policy: default-src 'self'
-
Hardcoded Password Removed ✅
- contact-service no longer has fallback credentials
Prioritized Remediation Plan
Immediate (Before Production)
- Add tests for critical auth/payment paths
- Verify XSS sanitization in ArticleDetailView/ServiceDetailView
- Implement CSRF protection
Short-term (1-2 weeks)
- Add request body size limits
- Standardize health check endpoints
- Extract rate limiter to shared package
- Add input length validation for content fields
Medium-term (1 month)
- Increase test coverage to >60%
- Implement API versioning
- Add structured logging
- Set up monitoring/alerting
Statistics Dashboard
Files Audited
- Go files: 12
- Vue/TypeScript files: 50+
- SQL migrations: 7
- Configuration files: 15+
Issues by Category
| Category | Count |
|---|---|
| Security | 5 |
| Testing | 2 |
| Code Quality | 6 |
| Architecture | 2 |
| Infrastructure | 1 |
Estimated Remediation Effort
- HIGH issues: ~4-8 hours each
- MEDIUM issues: ~2-4 hours each
- LOW issues: ~1-2 hours each
Total estimated effort: 30-50 developer hours
Conclusion
The codebase has shown significant improvement since the last audit with the implementation of refresh tokens, rate limiting, graceful shutdown, and database connection pooling. The most critical remaining issue is the low test coverage, which should be addressed before production deployment.
The security posture is now much stronger, but CSRF protection and comprehensive XSS verification should be prioritized. The code quality is acceptable for a project in active development, with the main concern being code duplication in rate limiting logic.
Generated by Coppertone.tech Audit Suite No stone unturned. No feelings spared.